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AMERICA'S FIRST "HATE SPEECH"
REGULATION
Michael W. McConnell*
Americans have the endearing but frustrating tendency to view
every development in public life as if it were happening for the first
time. Each issue is a new thing under the sun. Now the issue of
"hate speech"-speech that is designed to degrade or injure other
people on the basis of their race, ethnic origin, sex, sexual orientation or other sensitive characteristic-is the hot new free speech
question. The law reviews are filled with learned analyses. Task
forces have been appointed. Colleges and universities are debating
the question. Legislation has been introduced in Congress.
Yet to my knowledge, none of the scholarly analyses of the
issue has attempted to draw on the American historical experience
with this problem. "Hate speech" is one of the oldest public issues
in America; the first law was enacted almost 350 years ago. The
question traditionally has been framed in these terms: to what extent does a liberal society require social conditions of mutual respect and toleration, and to what extent may the force of law be
employed to attain or preserve those conditions? Attention to historical experience may help us to appreciate both the roots of hate
speech regulation and some of its pitfalls.
The first hate speech regulation in America was Maryland's
Toleration Act of 1649.1 Maryland had been founded a few years
earlier by a Roman Catholic nobleman and friend of Charles I,
Lord Baltimore. Lord Baltimore intended to make Maryland a haven for his fellow Catholics (who at that time were severely persecuted in the mother country) and to extend protection to other
dissenters from the Church of England as well. The Toleration Act,
which precedes by forty years the famous act of Parliament by that
name, was enacted by the colonial legislature, superseding a similar
• Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Thanks are due to AI Alschuler, AnneMarie Burley, David Currie, Richard Epstein, Abner Greene, Geoffrey Stone, David Strauss,
and Cass Sunstein for helpful comments on an earlier draft, to Ruth Bader Ginsburg for
encouragement to commit these ideas to paper, and to the Russell Baker Fund and the Class
of '49 Dean's Discretionary Fund for financial support.
I. Maryland Acts of Assembly, I, 244, quoted in Sanford H. Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America 376 (1902, reprinted Cooper Square, 1968) ("Religious Liberty").
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proclamation by Lord Baltimore. As part of legislation establishing
the "free exercise" of religion (the first appearance of those words in
the laws ofthis continent), the Act imposed a fine often shillings on
any person who called another "by such opprobrious terms as, Heretic, Schismatic, Idolator, Puritan, Independent, Presbyterian, Popish priest, Jesuit, Papist, Lutheran, Calvinist, Anabaptist,
Brownist, Antinomian, Barrowist, Roundhead, and Separatist. "2
In the only recorded prosecution under the statute or the predecessor proclamation, a Catholic named William Lewis was fined for
"interfering by opprobrious reproaches with two Protestants"3-an
encouraging sign, since most colonial officials at the time were
Catholics.
It may be objected that this statute deals with a subject-religion-far removed from today's concerns of race, sex, sexual orientation, and the like. But we must not commit the anachronism of
dismissing religion as a private matter of little weight or consequence. Religion was central to the Maryland colonists' identity,
and differences in religion were never far from their minds. Religious discord delivered Lord Baltimore's friend, Charles I, to the
scaffold, and England to civil war. Moreover, the immediate problem addressed by the Maryland Toleration Act was not unlike that
of today's hate speech regulations on campus. Words were used,
then as now, to inflict injury, to humiliate, to ostracize, and to
subordinate. Historian Sanford Cobb said of religious disputants in
seventeenth century Massachusetts that they "made of their
tongues weapons harder to bear than clubs."4 The Maryland Toleration Act is thus an exceedingly close analogy to the regulation of
hate speech on modern American campuses.
Unfortunately, we do not have much information about the
implementation or effects of the Toleration Act. Following the
downfall of the King, a Protestant faction seized power in the colony in 1652 and repealed the Toleration Act two years later, replacing it with a law explicitly denying protection to persons who
"profess the exercise of the Popish Religion."s Oliver Cromwell
forced the colonists to repeal the 1652 Act, thus reinstating the Toleration Act, but in the spirit of the day one would not expect faithful enforcement. Notwithstanding this lack of enforcement,
however, three aspects of the Maryland experience seem significant
today.
2. Cobb, Religious Liberty, at 376 (cited in note 1).
3. I d. at 372.
4. Id. at 215.
5. Maryland Acts of Assembly, I, 340, quoted in Cobb, Religious Liberty at 379 (cited
in note 1).
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First, the framers of the Maryland statute obviously thought
that outlawing hate speech ("opprobrious terms") was consistent
with-not in opposition to-a regime of free speech and religion.
Restrictions of this sort would advance free discourse and inquiry,
because they would enable persons of all groups, including the most
socially despised, to participate on equal terms. The Toleration Act
did not view religious freedom as meaning only an absence of governmental coercion; it sought to regulate the private sphere to ensure social conditions of toleration.
The idea that governmental intervention in the realm of speech
might promote the liberal society is utterly foreign to modem conceptions of freedom of speech, which are under challenge today
mostly from a segment of the post-modem left. Conservatives and
ACLU liberals alike share the conviction that the first amendment
is a restraint on the power of government and that the social conditions of tolerance, like the social conditions of patriotism, virtue, or
other ideals, must take care of themselves without the help of law.
The great free speech controversies of the twentieth century have
typically involved speakers-Jehovah's Witnesses, Nazis, or Communists-who were themselves intolerant of others.
The post-modem left challenge to the prevailing conception of
freedom of speech, of which hate speech regulation is the most conspicuous element, may seem newfangled and paradoxical. How can
the principle of freedom of speech empower the authorities to restrict the speech of private persons, however hateful that speech
may be? Surely such restrictions must be defended on the basis of
some goal (perhaps racial equality) other than promoting free discourse and inquiry, and must be subjected to a healthy dose of liberal skepticism.
It is helpful to realize that the post-modem left challenge to
free speech doctrine is not a new position. The hate speech regulators stand in the honorable shoes of Lord Baltimore and the Maryland colonists, who believed that private intolerance, through the
use of hurtful epithets, is a significant obstacle to achievement of a
society in which persons of all faiths (today we would say all races,
sexes, sexual orientations, and the like) can live together peaceably
and equally. In a world in which Catholics, for example, are both
seriously outnumbered and socially subordinated, a jurisdiction that
wants to offer Catholics a hospitable place in which to live must be
concerned with the danger that private intolerance will make that
objective unattainable. By the same token, if the desired end is a
community of inquiry in which all viewpoints and perspectives can
be shared, is it unreasonable for university administrators to think
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that an interventionist policy is necessary to ensure that some portions of the student body are not silenced and excluded from the
discourse?
Second, the framers of the Toleration Act of 1649 had a difficult drafting problem. They were caught between the dangers of
vagueness on the one hand and underinclusiveness on the other.
How could they define "hate speech" so that they could outlaw it?
The problem was particularly difficult because part of the religious
exercise they were protecting was the ability to proclaim the faith,
which often entails an explanation ("exhortation" might be a better
word) of why other religions are false. How could the colonial authorities tell when legitimate discourse ends and "opprobrious
terms" begin?
The Maryland drafters did not do a very good job. If their list
is taken to be exclusive, there are a number of opprobrious epithets
they left out: Socinian, ranter, pagan, Christ-killer, fanatic, hireling, and many more. If the list is taken only to be illustrative, it
doesn't solve the vagueness problem. If a Protestant maliciously
mocks the Latin of the mass by calling it "hocus-pocus,"6 is that
covered? If a Unitarian sneers at the credulity of those who believe
in a virgin birth, is that covered? Conversely, some of the terms in
the Maryland Act seem rather innocent. "Presbyterian," for example, is not an obvious example of an opprobrious epithet. And any
of the terms, in a certain context, might be perfectly legitimate.
That is the problem with legislation by list. If, however, the Maryland legislators had used another approach instead of listing forbidden epithets, they would have had a different set of problems. They
might have based the law on the actual intent of the speaker to
ostracize or subordinate members of a different faith, which makes
it virtually unenforceable. Only the speaker knows his own intent.
Or they might have based it on the effect on the hearer, which
makes it vaguer than ever, and makes speech vulnerable to the reactions of the most sensitive among us.
Modem campus administrators face much the same problem.
Like the Maryland legislators, they, too, could publish a list of forbidden epithets, the modem equivalents of "heretic," "schismatic,"
"papist," or "roundhead." We can all imagine the contents of the
list. But no university has opted for that approach, perhaps for reasons of good manners. Instead they opt for vagueness. The University of Michigan interim code-the one instituted after the first
effort was held unconstitutional by a federal court-forbids "verbal
6. The expression "hocus-pocus" is a corruption of the Latin hoc est corpus, "this is
my body," the eucharistic formula.
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slurs, invectives or epithets referring to an individual's race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation," etc., made with the "purpose
of injuring the person to whom the words or actions are directed,"
but excluding statements made as a part of a "discussion or exchange of an idea, ideology, or philosophy." 7 Try to figure out
when that will apply.
Given the difficulties of drafting intelligible standards, it should
come as no surprise that the enforcement of hate speech codes has
been clumsy and unpredictable. Under the original Michigan code,
for example, a graduate student was haled before a disciplinary
board to account for his statement in a social work class that he
believed homosexuality to be a disease and that he intended to develop a counseling program to help patients to overcome it.s Another student was "counseled" and required to apologize for
commenting in class that "he had heard that minorities had a difficult time in the course and that he had heard that they were not
treated fairly."9 At the same time, some of the more egregious incidents of racism on campus would apparently fall outside most hate
speech codes because they are directed at a general audience rather
than at a particular person whom they seek to injure.
Third, the selectivity reflected in the Maryland statute is not
random. Several epithets referring to Catholics are listed, because
they were precisely the protected class whom the colonial authorities had in mind. There are no epithets pertaining to Jews. There
are no epithets pertaining to atheists. There are no epithets pertaining to pagans, Muslims, or other assorted heathen-even though
the vast majority of the inhabitants of Maryland in 1649 adhered to
religions the legislators would have considered heathen. By interesting contrast, the 1669 Fundamental Constitutions of the Colony
of Carolina, drafted in part by John Locke, which was in other respects less liberal in its protection of religious freedom, explicitly
extended its protection to "Jews, heathens, and other dissenters
from the purity of Christian religion."Io
It was no accident that the Maryland legislature outlawed
some epithets and not others. Maryland was designed as a haven
7. University of Michigan Interim Policy on Discrimination and Discriminatory Conduct By Students in the University Environment, at 5.
8. The incident is recounted in Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 865
(E.D. Mich. 1989).
9. 721 F. Supp. at 866.
I 0. Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina § I07 ( 1669), reprinted in Mattie Erma Edwards Parker, ed., North Carolina Charters and Constitutions, 1578-1698 I32, I49 (Carolina
Charter Tercentenary Comm'n, I963).
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for religious dissenters, but religious dissenters of a particular kind.
Others were not welcome.
We see that same phenomenon in modem hate speech rules,
which forbid hate speech directed against certain groups but not
against others. You can, for example, call a fellow student a "racist,
fascist homophobe," or a "pimply nerd," or a "damn Yankee," with
impunity on any campus in America. Epithets like these serve no
less to cut off debate, to humiliate, to ostracize, and to exclude; but
they are not covered. Modem hate speech rules are intended to
protect groups, but only groups of a certain kind. The opinions of
significant subgroups of Americans on issues such as race and sexuality are not welcome on most American campuses. And these
voices are not often heard. Who wants to be hissed in class?
There is a distinction, one might respond: the Maryland statute leaves out groups that are disfavored by the hegemonic authorities, while the hate speech regulations protect the oppressed and
vulnerable in society. With all respect, this reflects a distorted picture of power relations in modem American academia. Most modem colleges and universities are passionately-<me might even say
religiously--(;()mmitted to a particular view of race, gender, and
sexual orientation. It is not merely a coincidence that the speech
protected by the hate speech regulations is speech that is broadly
consistent with the reigning orthodoxy, while the speech that is prohibited is contrary to it. Of course, some universities are exceptions; but the exceptional institutions typically have not enacted
speech codes.
The University of Michigan rules could just as easily have prohibited "verbal slurs, invective or epithets directed at an individual," with the same requirements of intention to injure and the
same exception for words used in course of the discussion or exchange of ideas-without confining the forbidden epithets to those
based on race, ethnicity, sex, sexual orientation, or the like. Nothing
would be lost by dropping the limitations. But I am aware of no
college or university that has adopted a hate speech regulation without the list of protected classes. That they do not do so is an indication that their framers are less concerned with hate speech in
general than with protecting their own ideological position-just as
the particular range of religious faiths protected by the Maryland
legislators was an indication of their ideological position.
College administrators sometimes defend selective protection
on the ground that racial, sexual, and other invective of the prohibited sort is more wounding than other types of opprobrious language. But how can we know? As an empirical matter I suspect
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that various fonns of personal insult ("pimply nerd") are, if anything, more humiliating-more humiliating precisely because there
will be no group to rally round in protest and indignation. Indeed,
the very fact that racist, sexist, and homophobic speech is so widely
condemned on campus suggests that its victims are not without social support. But even if college administrators could demonstrate
that the prohibited fonns of invective are more harmful, this would
not mean that other insults, which are also hurtful, should be excluded from protection. Why not prohibit all insults that have the
purpose and effect of silencing, subordinating, or excluding a fellow
member of the university community, without drawing dubious distinctions on the basis of content?
It is one thing for the authorities to promote civility in discourse. It is quite another thing to promote civility only selectively-to apply a double standard depending on whether the
incivility accords with or opposes the ideological position of the authorities. In this context, the content distinctions are suspiciously
congruent with the ideological position of the university. Hate
speech regulation can be seen as an effort to disarm one particularly
unappealing segment of the university's opponents without disarming any of its ideological allies.
An examination of the Maryland Toleration Act of 1649 thus
suggests that we should not accept too quickly the common position
of conservatives and ACLU liberals that hate speech regulation is,
in principle, contrary to the requirements of a free society. Our
early history shows that lawmakers no less committed to a free society than most of us came to the conclusion that a free, equal, and
tolerant society must protect its principles from the forces of intolerance, even when they manifest themselves in speech. But even if
we become more sympathetic, in principle, to the concept of hate
speech regulation, we should also be aware that there are grave, and
perhaps insuperable, difficulties in drafting regulations that are
broad enough without being vague. We must be ever conscious of
the possibility that, in the guise of regulations for the preservation
of toleration, the authorities will use their power over speech to advance their own ideological causes at the expense of dissenters.

